ABSTRACT Quantum private query (QPQ) requires that the database holder Bob knows nothing about his client Alice, including the index she provides and the element she obtains. However, on some occasion, Bob wants to know which element he has revealed to Alice. Therefore, we raise a symmetric quantum private query (SQPQ) problem in this paper. SQPQ can guarantee that Alice shares the real element with Bob and also partially protect the privacy of Alice's index. Some necessary conditions are need to satisfy to implement SQPQ. We prove that Alice must provide some extra information to enable Bob to know the element. Then, we define the term ''absolutely secure'', which is a security notion stronger than cheat sensitive, and prove that ''absolutely secure'' SQPQ is impossible. In addition, we raise a cheat sensitive scheme threedatabases-detection to implement SQPQ protocol. Finally, we construct a reduction from SQPQ to quantum bit commitment (QBC) to clarify that SQPQ is a problem more difficult than QBC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every day, hundreds of millions of interactions between users and databases around the world are used to query data. It is particularly important to protect sensitive information such as medical or criminal data. Such interactions can be modeled as a process between two parties, say, Alice and Bob. Alice submits an input to Bob and obtains an output. This input is named as index and the output is named as element. Alice wants to protect the privacy of her index (she also wants to keep the element in secret because the element will reveal the information of the index) and Bob wants to protect his database. Such a problem can be described as symmetrical private information retrieval (SPIR) [1] . Private information retrieval (PIR) problem [2] is an analogue of SPIR, which deals with user privacy alone. Both PIR and SPIR necessarily require O(N ) (N is the size of the database) computational complexity on the part of the database.
Quantum private query (QPQ) protocol is the quantum version of SPIR problem. Giovannetti et al. proposed the first QPQ protocol (GLM-protocol) and reduced communication and computation complexity to O(log N ) [3] - [5] . Then, The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Constantinos Marios Angelopoulos.
Olejnik presented an improved scheme O-protocol where only one query state is needed [6] . However, because of the difficulty of constructing high dimensional Oracle gate, the above protocols which are named as Oracle-gate based QPQ are not proper to large database. In order to solve QPQ problem in big data, Jakobi et al. designed a new QPQ protocol (J-protocol [7] ) based on SARG04 QKD protocol [8] . In SARG04 QKD protocol, a key is shared between Alice and Bob to encrypt the whole database by using quantum key distribution and Alice only knows few bits of the key.
Alice can decrypt what she is interested according to these bits in classical way. This kind of protocols are named as QKD-based QPQ. In this paper, we will debate according to the different protocols.
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) can be defined as the problem of n players computing an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way, where ''secure'' means to guarantee the correctness of the output as well as the privacy of the players' inputs, even when some players cheat [9] . SMC can be classified into massive problems, such as secret sharing [10] , [11] or bit commitment [12] , [13] , and can be applied in many fields, such as voting problem [14] , [15] or auction problem [16] , [17] . Quantum mechanics greatly increase the security of SMC. As a member of quantum secure multiparty computation, QPQ also can be applied into other SMC protocols. Yao's Millionaires' Problem [18] , secure multiparty computational geometry (SMCG) [19] , and quantum private set intersection (QPSI) [20] , [21] can be the variants of QPQ.
An SMC protocol is defined as asymmetric if the result of the function is provided to one single (predefined) player [22] . Comparatively, an SMC protocol is defined as symmetric if the result of the function is provided to all players. Secure two-party distance computation (S2PDC), as a special case of SMCG, is to calculate the distance of two parties without revealing their locations. Peng et al. utilized QPQ protocol to implement S2PDC [19] . However, Bob cannot share the distance with Alice because of the asymmetry of QPQ. Reference [23] solved the asymmetry of S2PDC by using dichotomy method. However, this method causes time difference to be attacked and cannot extend to help other protocols.
To solve above problems, we raise a symmetric quantum private query (SQPQ) based on QPQ. SQPQ is a problem aiming to help Bob get Alice's element in QPQ. SQPQ can also be applied into many occasions. For example, Bob has a database and he wants to control the risk caused by leaking elements. He will not open his database until Alice tells him the element she obtained. Another example is that a database holder wants to do an investigation about what elements his clients care about. His/Her clients are also willing to share their interests only if their indexes are kept secret. There is a question about how to prevent Alice from lying and protect Alice's index at the same time. In these occasions, SQPQ can create a win-win cooperation to both parties.
Our main results are as follows: Firstly, we present the improved protocol of QPQ as SQPQ, transferring a singlewin protocol to a double-win protocol. Secondly, we give some necessary conditions to implement SQPQ's properties. We prove that Alice needs to provide extra information to make QPQ turn to SQPQ, which can be regarded as a proof to QPQ's security by using no-clone theorem. We also present a term, absolutely secure, which is a security level more than cheat sensitive. We prove the absolutely secure SQPQ protocol is impossible. Thirdly, we present a cheat sensitive SQPQ protocol, Three-Database-Detection (TDD), and calculate the probability that dishonest Alice and Bob can escape from being detected. Fourthly, we construct a reduction from SQPQ scheme to QBC scheme.
The rest of the paper is structured as bellow: In Sec. II, we present SQPQ, containing the Oracle-gate based SQPQ and QKD-based SQPQ. Sec. III and Sec. IV present two models of Oracle-gate based SQPQ. In Sec. V, we introduce TDD scheme. In Sec. VI, we construct the reduction from SQPQ scheme to QBC scheme. Finally, we conclude with the shortcomings and improvements of this paper in Sec. VII.
II. SYMMETRIC QUANTUM PRIVATE QUERY
In order to give Bob the right to get Alice's answer, we present the symmetric quantum private query (SQPQ) protocol. SQPQ is a protocol which enables two parties to get the common element and also guarantees the privacy of both parties. SQPQ adds Bob's right to QPQ's condition and also relaxes the requirement of Alice's security. QPQ protocol can guarantee that Bob has no information about Alice's index but SQPQ cannot. Because of Def. 1, Alice will expose no less than log(N ) − log(n) bit information, where N is size of the database and n is the number of indexes whose elements are equal to Alice's element. When N is large enough, we assume that the distribution of database's element is binomial distribution and n = N /2. Then, Alice at least exposes 1 bit information.
Cheat sensitive is a security level presented by Hardy to evaluate SMC protocols [24] . In this paper, cheat sensitive SQPQ is defined as:
Definition 2: An SQPQ scheme is CHEAT SENSITIVE if:
(1) If Alice is cheating, her probability to be detected is larger than 0. (2) If Bob is cheating, his probability to be detected is larger than 0. Similarly, according to Oracle-gate-based QPQ and QKD-based QPQ, SQPQ protocol can also be divided into Oracle-gate-based SQPQ and QKD-based SQPQ.
A. ORACLE-GATE-BASED SQPQ
The Oracle-gate based QPQ machine can be modeled as Fig.1 and the Oracle-gate based SQPQ machine can be modeled as Fig.2 .
In the next two sections, we will analyze some characteristics about the extra information F. If F = ∅, we name it as directness model. In the directness model, Alice doesn't need to provide the extra information and Bob can get what he wants from |f (k) directly. Otherwise, if F = ∅, which we call as feedback model, Alice needs to provide extra information as the feedback for Bob. The extra information F is named as the feedback. Sometimes, the protocol also allows Bob to provide extra inputs like questions or detections. In the Three-Database-Detection (TDD) scheme, Bob will provide two more databases.
B. QKD-BASED SQPQ
QKD-based protocol applies the principles of the classical cryptography. In the first stage, Bob generates a public key and Alice only knows part of the key. In the second stage, Bob encrypts the whole database and enables that Alice's element is encrypted by her key. The classical cryptography is noted as E(·), which satisfies that:
where K (i) denotes the key of the index i, D(i) is the element of the index i and C(i) is the ciphertext of the index i. According to the rule of the classical cryptography, if Bob wants to obtain D(i), he must know the key and the ciphertext. However, he can deduce the index i if he gets the value of K (i) and C(i). Therefore, QKD-based SQPQ cannot be implemented.
III. DIRECTNESS MODEL
Before going further, it may be helpful to review the nocloning theorem. There are two kinds of quantum cloning (deterministic cloning and probabilistic cloning). Duan et al. gave a brief and clear definition about them [25] . No-cloning theorem indicates that: Theorem 1 (No-Cloning Theorem [26] - [28] ): Deterministic cloning of nonorthogonal states is impossible.
A. IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIRECTNESS MODEL
After clarifying the no-cloning theorem, we can reach the following conclusion: 
Theorem 2:
The directness model is impossible.
Proof: If directness model exists and the protocol can enable Bob to know the output deterministically, then Bob could clone an unknown state among |f (j) (j = 1, 2, . . . , N ), which contradicts the no-cloning theorem, if he uses the algorithm as below: (1) Bob constructs log(N ) databases to distinguish each index. For example, as to index j, the ith database's element is ith binary bit of j. (2) Alice submits an unknown state |f (k) to Bob and Bob can get the final output (each bit of the index). (3)Bob can get the value of k, and he can clone this unknown state (f (·) is known to Bob). In addition, |f (j) (j = 1, 2, . . . , N ) should not be orthogonal in SQPQ, or else Bob can distinguish between these states and the original QPQ is insecure. In this way, by adjusting databases, Bob can construct a cloning machine to clone nonorthogonal states from the directness model. Therefore, the existence of directness model and the no-cloning theorem are contradictory.
There is an example to interpret our proof. Given there is a quantum state |ψ and it is either
. According to no-cloning theorem, we cannot clone/distinguish these unknown states. However, if directness model based on O-protocol exists, we can copy these quantum states. Bob constructs a database as Tab. 1. When Alice wants to query index 1 (or 2) and provides
) as the input. According to Bob's right in SQPQ, Bob should know Alice's index's output as 1 (or 0) and he can deduce that this state is
). In other word, he can discriminate two nonorthogonal states. What's more, the impossibility of directness model protocol means that QPQ is secure. If directness model were implemented, Bob could use SQPQ in the QPQ protocol to eavesdrop Alice's output without making her alert. Therefore, it is reasonable to see that directness model is invalid.
B. ASSUMPTION OF PROBABILISTIC DIRECTNESS MODEL
In this subsection, we raise a consideration which is not proved to be feasible based on probabilistic cloning theorem. We have proved that the no-cloning theorem limits the feasibility of directness model. However, if we reduce the Bob's probability to get the final answer, this scheme may be feasible. According to the probabilistic cloning [25] in Lemma 1, we can clone an unknown quantum state with some probability. This probability is given in Lem. 2 Lemma 1 (Probabilistic Cloning [25] ): The states secretly chosen from the set T = {|ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , . . . , |ψ N } can be probabilistically cloned by a general unitary-reduction operation if and only if |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , . . . , and |ψ N are linearly independent.
Lemma 2 (Probabilistic Cloning [25] ): The quantum states |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , . . . , |ψ N can be probabilistically cloned with a diagonal efficiency matrix if and only if the matrix
In Lem. 2:
P i is the probability of cloning |ψ i . In QPQ protocol, every index's status is equal to each other, so
and we have:
When N = 2, according to Lem. 2 we have P ≤ 2/3. When N is bigger, we can easily conclude that P becomes smaller. If we add the measurement operation to the directness model, the model will become probabilistic directness model. We have the following theorem and lemma about the probabilistic directness model. Theorem 3: In the probabilistic directness model, Bob's probability to get the final output is no more than P, where
Proof: If this probability is more than P, then using the method presented in the proof of Theorem 2, Bob can clone an unknown state probabilistically. The probability is also more than P, which contradicts with the probabilistic cloning theorem.
Theorem 4: In the probabilistic directness model based on O-protocol, Bob's probability to get the final output is no more than 2/3.
If we don't use O-protocol and adjust the quantum state of O-protocol, this upper bound will change. It will be close to 1 when quantum states in the set are nearly orthogonal. However, the protection to Alice's privacy will become weaker. In addition, this upper bound is merely limited by the probabilistic cloning theorem. The existence of probabilistic directness model and Bob's compact probability to get the final answer is still a question.
IV. FEEDBACK MODEL A. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FEEDBACK MODEL
In this subsection, we discuss the scenario when the feedback is composed of classical bits. We will generalize the feedback to quantum version in the next subsection. In the feedback model, Alice will provide extra inputs. Therefore, Bob can deduce more information from the extra inputs and get more than log(N ) − log(n) bits information. First, we assume the feedback is finite. This assumption is reasonable because an infinite feedback cannot be implemented in a scheme. m is noted as the number of feedback bits. Secondly, we assume that there is only one feedback is regarded as the honest feedback. In other word, in all 2 m possible feedbacks, there is only one feedback that passes Bob's detection and other 2 n − 1 pieces will risk the detection. This assumption is also reasonable. This is because that if there are more than two honest feedbacks, then we can adjust the detection and shorten the feedback length. Before presenting the theorem, we introduce some definitions.
Definition 3 ((p,n)-Feedback Model):
A feedback model is defined as (p,n)-feedback model if Alice provides less than n bits information as the feedback and for every dishonest feedback Bob has more than p probability to be detected.
Definition 4 (Absolutely Secure):
Definition 5 (Escaper): A dishonest feedback that can escape the detection with probability 1 is named as the escaper.
It is easy to see from the above definitions that a feedback model is absolutely secure equals to there is no escaper in the feedback model. Absolutely secure is a security notion VOLUME 7, 2019 between unconditional security and cheat sensitive. If a SQPQ protocol is absolutely secure, the detection has a positive probability to detect every dishonest feedback. Then the detection has a positive probability to detect every cheating, which is defined as cheat sensitive. However, a cheat sensitive protocol is not necessarily an absolutely secure protocol. Three-Databases-Detection protocol in Sec.VII is such an example. TDD conceals the escaper by adding some random factors. Alice has 1 2 probability to find the escaper per query because which feedback is the escaper is decided by Bob. But once Alice find the escaper, she will have probability 1 to pass the detection.
Theorem 5: The absolutely secure feedback model is impossible.
Proof: We first prove the lemma below. Lemma 3: If the absolutely secure feedback model exists, then there exists another feedback model that can detect Alice's cheating with a probability of 1-ε for all 0 < ε < 1.
Proof: There exists a (p,n)-feedback model and p > 0. Then, ∃N = logε log(1−p) is finite, when Bob requires Alice to repeat n-bit sequences N times, the probability to detect successfully reaches
Now we assume that (p,n)-feedback model exists. Then Alice sends an unknown state which belongs to the set T = {|ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , . . . , |ψ N } to Bob. Each pair of quantum states in T is nonorthogonal. Then, Bob can use Bruteforce Method to generate 2 n pieces of binary sequence. Bob repeats them N times and operates the feedback model system on them. The probability to detect all 2 n − 1 dishonest sequences is P = (1 − ε) (2 n −1) . If Bob can detect all dihonest sequences, he can distinguish the honest one and use the binary sequence to get the output. Then, Bob can clone quantum states when he gets the output if he follows the scheme in the directness model. Therefore, the probability that Bob clones an unknown quantum state is P = (1 − ε) (2 n −1) . However, with ε converging to 0, P = (1 − ε) (2 n −1) will converge to 1. In other word, the probability for Bob to clone an unknown quantum state is close to 1, which contradicts probabilistic cloning theorem. In conclusion, the feedback model is impossible.
B. FEEDBACK WITH QUANTUM STATES
In this subsection, we discuss the condition when the feedback contains qubits.
We define Alice's feedback set F as a set containing multiple bits B and qubits Q: Suppose that there exists a detection scheme that can detect whether Alice cheats. We denote this detection scheme T (·) and it satisfies:
More importantly, a detection operation should be deterministic. Therefore, we assume that all operators should be unitary and the measurement operators should not appear in T (·). That is to say, after Bob operating T (·) on the quantum states Q, he can recover the quantum states to Q again.
Definition 6: Given |f (k) , a qubit set Q k is an Honest Qubit Feedback of the index k and a binary set B k is an
Similarly, there is only one pair of (B k , Q k ) for the index k.
Theorem 6: The absolutely secure feedback model (with quantum states) is impossible.
Proof: As an index i from Alice, its honest qubit feedback is Q i and honest bit feedback is B i . If Q i = Q j for all other index j, then Bob can get index i by using Brute-force method to B i , |f (i) when he gets Q i from Alice. He will try 2 m N times to find the value of i and B i satisfying that T (B i , Q i , |f (i) ) = 0. Therefore, this model cannot protect Alice's privacy.
If there exists an index j satisfying that Q i = Q j , then Bob can construct a clone machine to clone these two quantum states. Firstly, he prepares a database as shown in as Tab. 2. He also prepares a set Q (= Q i = Q j ) as input. Secondly, he uses Brute-force method to get set B to make T (B, Q, |f (k) ) = 0, k = i or j. Bob gets (B i , |f (i) ), (B j , |f (j) ) in this way. Thirdly, he can distinguish and clone these quantum states because T (Q, B i , |f (i) ) = 0 and T (Q, B i , |f (j) ) = 1. Therefore, the feedback model with quantum states is impossible.
To sum up, the probability of detecting cheating never reaches 1 because there always exists a probability for Alice to guess the escaper. Therefore, the security level, cheating sensitive, is the upper bound of security to SQPQ protocol.
V. THREE-DATABASES-DETECTION (TDD)
The impossibility of the directness model indicates that Bob cannot get the final answer without Alice's extra information. The impossibility of the feedback model indicates that there is always a dishonest response to escape from the detection. When Bob adds the random factors to SQPQ, this dishonest response becomes stochastic. Namely, it is difficult for Alice to find this response. TDD protocol is based on this idea.
In TDD protocol, Bob constructs two anti-cheating databases in addition to the original database, the contents of these databases are shown in Tab. 3. The first database is the original database. The second is the database whose outputs are all 0. The third is the database whose outputs are all 1 (we set index 0's output 1 to satisfy O-protocol). The specific content of our protocol is as below:
(1) Initialize the counter c = 1.
(2) Alice uses arbitrary QPQ protocol to query the output of her index three times. Bob provides a database from three databases each time. Each database cannot be provided twice.
(3) After each query, Alice sends a classic bit to Bob presenting the output is 0 or 1.
(4) Both parties end the protocol if conditions occur as the following:
• Bob checks the classical information transmitted from Alice: if the result of the anti-cheating databases does not match the actual output, then Alice lies and Bob terminates the protocol.
• Skip this decision if c = 1. Alice compares the results obtained in this round with those in the previous round (there is no need to care about the order of the data).
If the results are found to be inconsistent, then Bob cheats and Alice terminates the protocol. Bob also compares the results from Alice in this way.
• If c > log N −3 3
, then Bob can get the final answer correctly and Alice can get the answer from the number of results she obtains. (5) If the protocol does not end, then add the value of the counter c to 1 and return to step (2) .
In this protocol, the communication between Alice and Bob is protected by QKD technology, so we do not consider the probability of eavesdropping. Before we analyze the feasibility and security of our TDD protocol, we should assume that Bob must submit a correct database to cooperate with Alice. If Bob submits a database as the inverse of the original database, he can also get the element and will never be detected by any scheme. In this way, Alice will get the wrong answer.
The parameter c is the iteration time to repeat the scheme. With c getting bigger, the detection will have a larger probability to detect cheating but Alice will expose more information. When Alice tells the element to Bob in once QPQ query, she will expose log(N ) − log(n) bits information, where N is the number of Alice's possible indexes and n is the number of the indexes whose outputs are what Alice told to Bob.
If the database is large, we can assume that the number of 1s in the output is equal to the number of 0s. Therefore, Alice will expose log(N ) − log(N /2) = 1 bit information. Our scheme has three queries and Alice will expose 3 bits in each iteration. In order to ensure that Alice does not leak all of the information, the protocol requires a maximum of log n − 3 3 rounds. TDD protocol can be regarded as a feedback model if it adopts Oracle-gate based QPQ. In our TDD scheme, Alice will send three quantum states and three bits to Bob. However, TDD is not absolutely secure. If Alice lies on the real database other than anti-cheating databases, she will never be detected. As to TDD protocol, we use classical method to analyze the security. From the scheme, we find TDD mainly uses classical method to implement SQPQ. The quantum attack (like measurement-and-resend attack) can be defended by QPQ itself.
Theorem 7: In TDD protocol, the Alice's probability to cheat is less than 2
. Proof: First of all, we can assume that the measured data of the unknown states sent by Bob in the first round is (0, 1, 1). Among them, Alice can know that 0 is definitely from the anti-cheating database. If Alice wants to cheat, he must change one of two 1s to 0. In this case, the anticheating database has a 1/2 probability to discover that Alice is cheating. Combined with the number of iterations of the protocol, it can be calculated that the Alice's probability to cheat is less than 2 Proof: We put the proof of Theorem 8 in the appendix. Based on Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, we can conclude that with the increase in items N , the probability of success of Alice and Bob cheating is continuously decreasing, and it is inversely proportional to N . And both Alice and Bob have a good reason to execute multiple rounds of protocol because they need to detect each other's cheating. Therefore, our protocol can guarantee mutually distrusted parties to communicate in the SQPQ protocol.
In the process of constructing TDD, we find it is difficult to balance the privacy of two parties. When the scheme gives one party the right to detect his/her opponent, it also provides the motivation to cheat for this party. For example, TDD allows Bob to generate three databases to prevent from Alice's lying. However, Bob can generate some special databases to obtain more information from Alice's privacy. Similarly, the quantum bit commitment (QBC) has the same contradiction. Therefore, we explore the relationship between SQPQ and QBC and we find that SQPQ can be reduced to QBC.
VI. SQPQ-BASED BIT COMMITMENT A. TIME DIFFERENCE
In TDD scheme, Alice needs to repeat the same step for three times in a counter: querying the element, returning the VOLUME 7, 2019 element, querying the element, returning the element, querying the element, returning the element. To be convenient, we can adjust the order of TDD scheme. Alice can query three elements together and return the three elements simultaneously. In this way, TDD algorithm can be divided into two phases-querying phase and sharing phase. In the querying phase, Alice can query the element by QPQ protocol while Bob cannot. In the sharing phase, Alice shares the element with Bob and responses the answer to the detection to prove she is honest.
There exists a time difference between Alice and Bob. Alice knows the element earlier than Bob in the above situation. [23] defines the conception about the Simultaneity condition, which indicates that all parties know the answer of SMC protocol simultaneously. As the [23] says, the protocol which satisfies the Simultaneity condition is more secure because the time difference gives chance to cheat. However, we find that the time difference of SQPQ causes the separation of querying phase and sharing phase and the separation has some interesting characteristics concerning about the bit commitment protocol. (Of course, eliminating the time difference is another problem to strengthen the security.)
B. BIT COMMITMENT
Bit commitment (BC) is a noted SMC protocol consisting of two phases: commit phase and unveil phase. In the commit phase, Alice chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} as a commitment and sends Bob an encryption of this bit. Later, unveil phase can be executed under Alice's permission to help Bob reconstruct Alice's committed bit to b . The bit commitment should satisfy that:
• Correctness: It should always be that b = b if both Alice and Bob execute the protocol honestly.
• Concealing: Before the opening phase, Bob cannot know the committed bit.
• Binding: After the commit phase, Alice cannot change the committed bit. Although the unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is proved to be impossible [29] , [30] , several QBC protocols, which satisfy some other notions of security, have been proposed, such as cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment (CSQBC) protocols [24] , [31] , [32] . Thus, a natural question arises: Is it a coincidence that SQPQ and QBC have the same security level?
C. SQPQ-BASED BIT COMMITMENT
In this subsection, we reduce SQPQ problem to QBC. Assuming that A represents the set contains all cheat sensitive SQPQ scheme. B ⊂ A contains the scheme that can be divided into querying phase and sharing phase. In the querying phase, Alice uses QPQ to query the element from Bob's database and Bob gets nothing. In the sharing phase, the scheme can guarantee that Alice tells the element to Bob honestly. In Subsection VI-A, by improving TDD, we can obtain a scheme belonging to B. Therefore, B = ∅. Then we have:
Theorem 9: For each SQPQ scheme belonging to B, QBC can be constructed as below:
Commit phase:
(1) Bob generates a random database and publishes his database.
(2) Alice chooses an index whose element is her committed bit.
(3) Alice uses querying phase to get the element. If the element is not equal to her committed bit, she terminate the scheme.
Unveil phase:
(1) Alice executes the sharing phase and Bob obtains the element as the commitment.
Proof: Correctness: If both parties execute the scheme honestly, Alice will choose the committed bit she wants and Bob will obtain this bit because of the correctness of SQPQ.
Concealing: In the query phase is SQPQ, Bob doesn't know the element. This is limited by QPQ security. Therefore, Bob doesn't know the committed bit.
Binding: As a security criteria in SQPQ, Alice cannot tell a lie about the element without risking detection. Therefore, she will not change the committed bit after the commit phase.
Therefore, SQPQ-based bit commitment scheme can be constructed successfully.
In other word, SQPQ can be regarded as a problem which is more difficult than QBC. SQPQ can not only solve QBC problem, but also has the query function.
VII. CONCLUSION
We raised SQPQ problem in this paper and prove that there is no absolutely secure SQPQ protocol. The proof of the directness model showed that Alice must expose some of her information in SQPQ protocol; The proof of the feedback model made out that there always exists a dishonest response that escapes from the detection. Finally, we raised TDD protocol to solve SQPQ problem and clarified the relationship between SQPQ and QBC.
One of the advantages of TDD is that it is proper to all QPQ protocols. TDD is an additional protocol of QPQ. In addition, TDD is also proper to classical SPIR problem.
This paper still has space for improvement. We raise an assumption of probabilistical SQPQ. In our assumption, if Bob's probability to get the final answer is less than the upper bound which probabilistical cloning theorem gives, the existence of probabilistic SQPQ is not limited by probabilistical cloning theorem. However, whether this assumption is feasible or whether the upper bound of cloning theorem is compact to probabilistical SQPQ has not been solved. Eliminating the time difference is another problem to ensure the scheme more secure and fair.
In addition, TDD is also not perfect. TDD only gives a scheme detect cheating in SQPQ protocol and doesn't use the quantum method itself. Both parties' probabilities to escape from the detection may also not be minimum.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Proof: We can assume that Alice is honest. In the first round of operation of the protocol, Bob can choose to honestly reply to Alice three unknown states, or use the other three prepared databases to obtain more information about the unknown state. Of course, if Bob wants to deceive Alice, he must risk the detection. We can define Bob's revenue function as
where i denotes that the protocol proceeds to the i-th round, h i is the information about the unknown state that can be obtained by Bob in the i-th round, P i is Bob's probability to cheat in the i-th round. Then, Bob's goal is to maximize g(N ). We first assume that Bob adopts the same cheating strategy after the first iteration. Here we discuss the situation: 1, 1) ).
• i > 1: Assuming that the result of the first round is (0, 1, 1). If Bob tampers only one database per round (the other two are anti-cheating database), then P i is the Bob's probability to tamper without influencing Alice's output (i.e., Bob doesn't change the corresponding result of the unknown state in the original database), and h i = − log P i (P i also means the proportion Bob doesn't change in the database). For example, Bob replaces some 0s with 1s in all-zero database and we assume that the number he tampers is r. In the new database, there are r 1s and N − r 0s. The probability that Bob does not interfere with Alice's final result is p = (N − r)/N . If Bob cheats successfully, he will realize that Alice's secret is in the index he has not changed. Before Bob cheating, there are unknown log(N ) bits from Alice and there remains log(N − r) bits after cheating. In this way, cheating helps Bob get log(N ) − log(N − r) = − log(p) bits from Alice. Bob can decide the number of outputs he changes to control the probability. The more outputs he changes, the easier he will be caught cheating but the more information he can get from Alice. Assuming that the uncertain information of the unknown state after the first round is l-bits, then
We can conclude that f (n) is not related to the choice of P i . If Bob tries to tamper with two databases in the same round, then bit combinations that Bob can tamper with are (1, 1), (0, 1) and (0, 1), and let P i1 and P i2 be the probability that he cheated on the two bits of two databases respectively. It is wiser if Bob tampers (0, 1) combination because this combination has higher error tolerance. When both changes work on Alice's index or neither changes work on Alice's index, Bob will not be detected. Bob's revenue function can be described as below:
Similarly, if Bob chooses to tamper three databases. The probability that the output changes from (0,1,1) to (0,1,1) is P i1 P i2 P i3 ; The probability that the output changes from (0,1,1) to (1,0,1) is (1 − P i1 )(1 − P i2 )P i3 ; The probability that the output changes from (0,1,1) to
All of the three scenarios can be regarded as successful cheating.
The above two functions are very complex and not continuous. We visualized these two functions in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 whose X-axis is P i1 and Y-axis is P i2 and Z-axis is g(N ). We set the value of P 1 be 1 and set values of l in four pictures be (3, 5, 10, 20) . In Fig. 4 , in every graph, we superimpose multiple 3D graphs whose P i3 is in [0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9]. Tab.4 indicates that the maximum points Bob should choose. Unfortunately, above figures and tables are imprecise and ruleless. Because of the abstractness and discontinuity, this optimization problem cannot be solved by known methods. But we can get from Tab.4, it is better for Bob to tamper three databases. With N getting bigger (l getting bigger), Bob's probability gets smaller. We attempt to give an upper bound in this paragraph. However, this bound is not compact. Given the function as belows:
h (l) = P i1 P i2 P i3 h (l + log(P i1 P i2 P i3 )) + (1 − P i1 )(1 − P i2 )P i3 h (l + log((1 − P i1 )(1 − P i2 )P i3 )) h (l + log((1 − P i1 )P i2 (1 − P i3 ))) + P i1 (1 − P i2 )(1 − P i3 ) h (l + log(P i1 (1 − P i2 )(1 − P i3 )))
Of course, we have h (l) ≥ h 3 (l) because the last item is positive. When P i3 = 1, h (l) = h 2 (l). Therefore the maximum of h (l) is more than h 3 (l) and h 2 (l). Similarly, in Fig. 5 and Tab. 5, we list some information about h (l). From Fig. 5 , we find that the function is symmetric and the middle is significantly higher than the edge. In Tab. 5, we find that [0.5, 0.5, 0.5] can be regarded as the best probability combination for Bob to choose. There is an exception when l = 10, but the value of the function is still far larger than the value presented in Tab. 4 when P i1 = P i2 = P i3 = 0.5 (h(p = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5], l = 10) = 0.0625). Therefore, we believe that: Another meaning of h (l) is that ∀l, p = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5] makes h (l) maximum. That is to say, ∀l, ∀p i = [p i1 , p i2 , p i3 ], i = 1, 2, · · · , log N −3 3 , Bob's probability to cheat is still less than h (l, [0.5, 0.5, 0.5]). Therefore, when Bob adopts different strategies, his probability to escape from the detection is still less than ( . 
